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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

WILLIE M. SALAS,
Plaintiff,
SUPREME COURT
NO. 14493

vs.
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF
UTAH, EATON METAL PRODUCTS COMPANY,
AND THE STATE INSURANCE FUND,
Defendants,
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

NATURE OF THE CASE
Plaintiff alleged a willful failure on the part of
Defendant "to comply with the law or any lawful order of the
Industrial Commission" and therefore claimed entitlement to
a 15% increase in his Workman's Compensation benefits as allowed
by U. C. A., 1953, §35-1-12.
DISPOSITION BY THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
The Administrative Law Judge denied the additional
benefits as claimed.

The Plaintiff timely filed a Motion For

Review with the Industrial Commission.

The Industrial Commission

affirmed the decision of the Administrative Law Judge.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendants respectfully ask that the decision denying
the increased benefits be affirmed by this Court.
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FACTS
i

Plaintiff was totally and permanently incapacitated
in a most tragic industrial accident which occurred on June 11,
19 73.

At that time he was employed by Defendant, Eaton Metal

Products Company.

The accident occurred when the boom of a crane

which was under repair slipped from a metal support that had been
placed under it and struck Plaintiff.
paraplegia.

His injuries resulted in

Other pertinent facts will be brought out in the

arguments that follow.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
PLAINTIFF IS NOT ENTITLED TO FIFTEEN PERCENT INCREASE
IN HIS COMPENSATION BECAUSE PLAINTIFF HAS NOT PRESENTED SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT A FINDING OF A WILLFUL FAILURE OF
DEFENDANT TO COMPLY WITH THE LAW OR ANY LAWFUL ORDER OF THE
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION.
Plaintiff has claimed that Defendant was at the time
of the accident and injury in issue in violation of U. C. A.,
1953, §35-1-12. For the convenience of the Court, that section
is set forth below:
No employer shall construct or occupy or maintain any place of employment that is not safe, or
require or knowingly permit any employee to be in any
employment or place of employment which is not safe,
or fail to provide and use safety devices and safeguards , or fail to obey and follow orders of the
commission or to adopt and use methods and processes
reasonably adequate to render such employment and
place of employment safe, and no employer shall fail
or neglect to do every other thing reasonably necessary
-2-
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to protect the life, health, safety and welfare
of his employees. Where injury is caused by the
willful failure of an employer to comply with the
law or any lawful order of the industrial commission, compensation as provided for in this title
shall be increased fifteen percent, except in
case of injury resulting in death. (Emphasis added)
The crux of a determination of a breach of the above
statute requires first that there be a failure of the employer
1) "to obey a law11,or 2) "any lawful order of the Industrial
Commission", and 3) that failure must be "willful".
Plaintiff makes no claim that Defendant failed to
obey any lawful order of the Industrial Commission and the
record is void of evidence of any such breach.
Plaintiff does claim that there is evidence to support
its claim that Defendant "willfully" failed to have a safety
program in effect and presumably that said "willful" failure
caused the unfortunate accident to Mr. Salas (See Applicant's
brief at pages 3 and 4).
The real basis of any claim for a 15% increase in
benefits depends on a determination of what constitutes willfulness on the part of an employer.
that determination.

This Court long ago made

In the cases of Western Clay & Metals

Company v. Industrial Commission, 70 Utah 279, 259 Pac. 279
(Utah 1927) and Utah Mining Company v. Industrial Commission,
62 Utah 421, 220 Pac. 389 (Utah 1923)-.

In both of those cases,

the Industrial Commission made a determination that there had
been a willful violation by the employer of general safety orders
-3Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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enacted by the Commission.
In

Park Utah, supra., the Court explained its decision

in reversing the Industrial Commission in the following terms:
"It should be stated that there is no evidence
in the record that any notice had been given, or
suggestion made, to the plaintiff mining company that
the method employed by it was not satisfactory to
the Commission, or that the Commission considered
the method employed as less likely to accomplish the
purpose for which the order had been issued. In fact,
it is not shown that the mining company had any actual
knowledge of the existence of this general order."
(Emphasis added) (62 U. 421 at 424)
Not only did Defendant employer herein not have notice
of any order of the Commission, there is no evidence one existed.
The Court went on to further define willfulness:
"The authorities, however, are agreed that negligence
alone, or even gross negligence, is not sufficeint to
constitute "willful failure" or "serious"failure" to
comply with the requirements of the statute or orders
of the Commission. There is nothing in the findings
or m the evidence before the Commission to indicate
or suggest that the plaintiff mining company or its
superintendent was acting in disregard of the safety of
its employes, or to indicate a willingness on the part
of the superintendent to inflict injury upon the employes."
(Emphasis added) (62 U. 421 at 425)
The Court amplified that definition in Western Clay
Metals, supra., by citing with approval the standards for
"willfulness" of several other jurisdictions:
" I n Wick v. Gunn, 66 Okla. 316, 169 Pac. 1087, 4
A.L.R. 10 7, the term "wilful failure," as used in the
Workmenfs Compensation Act, as applied to the conduct
of an employee, was held to mean, not merely voluntary
and intentional, but to carry with it the idea of premeditation, obstinacy, and intentional wrong doing."
"In Bersch v. Morris & Co., 106 Kan. 800, 189
P. 934, 9 A. L. R. 1374, the court said that the meaning
-4Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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of the words "willful failure" is not necessarily fulfilled
by voluntary and intentional omission, but includes the
element of intractableness, the headstrong disposition
to act by the rule of contradiction."
"In Nashville, C. & St. L» Ry. Co. v. Wright, 147
Tenn. 619, 250 S. W. 903, the words were interpreted to
mean something more than negligence and carrying the idea
of deliberation and intentional wrongdoing." (Emphasis added)
A review of the record shows that the above criteria
are most certainly not supported by the evidence produced by
Plaintiff in the record.
Mr. Steven Lee, Division Manager at Defendant, Eaton
Metals, was aware that the boom which fell and struck Plaintiff
had been propped up so the internals could be taken out for
repair. (R. 66 & 70)

The company conducted periodic safety meetings

(R. 71). He felt in his own mind that the metal support under the
boom was adequate and safe while the maintenance was being done
and that it wasn't hazardous to anyone. (R. 72)

He received

no notice from anyone that a hazard existed there. (R. 73)
Mr. Lee was also of the opinion that Plaintiff was a
good worker who had had no problems with him or anyone else
at Eaton. (R. 73-74)
Elf ego Agui-lar was the next to testify.

Mr. Aginlar

is a good friend of the Plaintiff and is in fact married to
Plaintiff's cousin.

He saw the boom fall the Friday before the

injury to Plaintiff when the brake drum broke down.

The first

time he saw the boom propped up by the pipe support was the
morning of the accident the following Monday.

(R. 86-88)

There is no evidence that Mr. Agui-lar gave notice to anyone in
-5Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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authority that the boom support was insufficient and hazardous.
Bob Lemon was a welder at Eaton and sometime operator
of the crane in question.
Eaton (R. 91)

He was also the Union Steward at

He affirmed that the crane broke down while he

was operating it the Friday before the accident and that it
had fallen. (R. 9 4)

He stated that on a few occasions before

there had been problems of different sorts with that particular
crane. (R. 96-99)

He told his supervisor Dutch

the preceeding

Friday that the crane was unsafe in its present condition and
Dutch said he would have it fixed. (R. 102)

As promised by Dutch,

maintenance was in the process -of correcting the problem with
the crane when Plaintiff was injured. (R. 115)
Each time there was a problem with the crane it was
reported to maintenance and the problem was corrected.

At the

time of the accident the boom was propped up while they were
waiting for parts.

(R. 99)

When Mr. Lemon went to work on

the Monday morning of the accident he stated he felt the area
was unsafe, but he took no action to notify or warn anyone.
(R. 107, 120)
Plaintiff*s witness Steven Carlson saw the boom sitting
on the pipe for the first time, as did the others, on the morning
of the accident. (R. 12 4)

He never made any comments to his

supervisor, Dutch, about any hazard he may have sensed. (R. 133)
An accident inspection report of Sam Mulliner's made
in his official capacity as a State Safety Inspector for the
^6Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Utah Occupational Safety and Health Division, was properly
introduced into evidence by Defendant as an exception to the
hearsay rule under the Utah Rules of Evidence Sections 6 3 (15),
Reports and Findings of Public Officials; 6 3 (16), Filed Reports,
Made by People Exclusively Authorized; and 64 (17) Content of
Official Record. (R. 15 4-157)

That report described the accident

and stated there was no violation of a standard.
"33. Describe accident - A crane boom being
repaired was blocked up at one end with a 3" pipe
support. The pipe support was on a 1" piece of steel
plating. The victam (sic) and other workman were
removing plate hook from steel plate under the boom.
The support slipped when the plate was lifted with a
pry bar. The boom fell, striking victam (sic).
X

X

X

35. Did a violation of a standard cause or contribute to this accident* - Yes (SoJP (Emphasis added circle around "No" in original report)
Additional evidence from Mr. Mulliner was introduced
into evidence in the form of a letter dated October 20, 1974.
(R. 16 4-66)

Said letter was introduced over the objection of

the Defendant on the ground that it was hearsay procured by
Plaintiff's counsel by a letter apparently sent to Mr. Mulliner
propounding questions not introduced into evidence.

It was

considered along with all of the other evidence by the Administrative Law Judge in denying the Plaintiff's claim for increased
benefits.

In any event, all that Mr. Mulliner adds to the

evidence is that supervision was lax and a safety program was
-7-
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not in effect. (R. 164-166)

Section 35-1-12, U. C. A. , 1953

does not give any specifics for a safety program and does not
in fact require a specific safety plan.

Apparently, the statute

leaves it to the Industrial Commission to promulgate such standards
rules and regulations for a particular place of business and the
industry as a whole in the state as in its discretion the
Commission deems proper.

No such safety plan appears in the

record.
Plaintiff makes a point in his brief at Page 3 that
testimony of notice to the employer of an unsafe condition was
wrongly excluded because it was hearsay.

The issue really

isn't the admissibility of the hearsay evidence.

Instead, the

issue is whether a finding of fact in favor of Plainiff can be
based on hearsay alone.

There is no other evidence of notice

to the employer or of a lack of a safety program at Eaton,
for that matter other than hearsay evidence.

There must be

a "residuum of evidence, legal and competent in a Court of law,
to support a claim before an award can be made, and the finding
cannot be based wholly upon hearsay evidence".

Ogden Iron Works

v. Industrial Commission, 102 U. 492, at 498, 132 P2d 276 (1942).
See also Garfield Smelting Co. v. Industrial Commission, 53 U.
133, 178 P. 57.
All of the evidence on those two points that Plaintiff
would introduce was and is hearsay.

In fact, all of the legally

competent evidence on those two issues

directly contradicts

any indication of prior notice to the employer of a hazard and
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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the lack of a safety program. (See the summaries of the witnesses1

testimony hereinabove)
Even taking all of the evidence into consideration,
both hearsay and competent evidence, the record firmly and
without doubt supports the decision of the Administrative Law
Judge that:

"On this state of the record it is concluded that

claimant has not established a willful failure of his employer
to comply with the law or a lawful order of the Commission..."
(R. 210-211)
It is further obvious that there is nothing in the
record that any act or omission, if any, on the part of Defendant gave rise to "...the idea of premeditation, obstinancy,
and intentional wrong doing" or that such acts or omissions,
if any, included "...the element of intractableness, the headstrong disposition to act by the rule of contradiction" or
that said acts or omissions, if any, carried "...the idea of
deliberation".

Park Utah Mining/ supra.

The burden is upon the Plaintiff in this appeal to
show that the Industrial Commission was capricious and arbitrary
in its denial of Plaintiff's application.

That burden is

succinctly explained in Long v. Western States Refining Company
et al, 14 Utah 2d 398, 384 P2d, 1015 (Utah 1963) at 384 P2d 1016:
"We do not question the principle advocated that
the Commission should resolve doubts in favor of
coverage of the employee to effectuate the purposes
of the act by providing compensation for injuries
suffered in employment; nor that had the Commission
been disposed to so find, there is a basis in the
evidence upon which it could have determined that
-9Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Mr. Long suffered an accidental injury in the course
of his employment which resulted in his death. Nevertheless , our statute, Sec. 35-1-85, U.C.A. 195 3, grants
the Commission the prerogative of finding the facts.
When it has denied the application for compensation
and a reversal is sought, the applicant, as the moving
party, has the burden of showing that the evidence is
such that a finding in her favor is the only reasonable
finding that could be made, so that the Commission's
refusal to so find was capricious and arbitrary. Reflection upon the evidence recited above will show clearly
that this is not the situation here, and that there is ample
justification therein for the Commission's refusal to believe
that there was an industrial accident." (Emphasis added)
The case at bar differs from the above only in that
there is no basis in the evidence to support Plaintiff's claim
of "willfulness" and therefore, the only reasonable position the
Industrial Commission could have taken was a denial.
ARGUMENT
;,,

POINT II

PLAINTIFF WAS NOT DENIED ACCESS TO THE RECORD IN
PREPARATION OF HIS MOTION FOR REVIEW OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW JUDGE'S DENIAL OF HIS APPLICATION.
In Point II of his brief Plaintiff asserts that he
was not given the 20 days he requested to review the record and
transcript of the hearing.
That simply is not true.
1975. (R. 215)

(Appellant's brief at pages 6-7)

His request was made December 12,

The Denial of Claimant's Petition For Review

was not entered until January 27, 1976. (R. 217)

Forty-six

days had passed during which it appears no attempt was made
by Plaintiff to request the reporter to prepare a transcript.
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The Industrial Commission file, being a public record was
open to Plaintiff any time during that period.

It is not

the duty of Defendant to supply a transcript of the hearing
to Plaintiff, nor is it the duty of the Commission or the
reporter to supply the transcript to Plaintiff when he doesn't
take the necessary step to order it.
Further, even if this proved to be error on the part
of the Industrial Commission it would create no difference in
the state of the record.

Plaintiff still would not have been

able to support his claim for a 15% increase in his benefits.
It would be at most harmless error.
ARGUMENT
POINT III
PLAINTIFF WAS NOT DENIED A FULL AND FAIR HEARING.
At Page 7 in Plaintiff's brief is the accusation
that the Administrative Law Judge "failed and refused to
schedule the continued hearing" during which time a crucial
witness, Sam Mulliner, left the jurisdiction and his testimony
was therefore lost. A review of the record will show the
falacy of this contention.
The hearing on this matter was originally scheduled
for September 5, 1974, but pursuant to a telephone call of
Plaintiff's counsel, the matter was actually heard August 7,
1974. (R. 24-25)
-11-
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In the original notice, both Defendant and Plaintiff
were advised:
"Cases must be prepared before the hearing. All
necessary witnesses, ... must be ready at the hearing..."
"Single hearings are favored, and the policy of
the Commission is against continuances, changes,
or further hearings." (R. 24)
Plaintiff was aware of these policies and certainly
availed himself of the subpoena power.

No less than nine

subpoenas were served at the behest of Plaintiff. (R. 29-45)
Sam Mulliner was not among those subpoened though his report
was of public record and his identity easily discernible.
However, in order to be more than fair, the Administrative
Law Judge did grant a continuance so that Plaintiff could secure
Mr. Mulliner as a witness.
On October 29, 1974, counsel for Plaintiff sent a letter
to the Administrative Law Judge in which he included a letter
from Mr. Sam Mulliner dated October 20, 19 74, in which Mr. Mulliner
refers to a letter of inquiry from counsel for Plaintiff of
October 11, 1974. (R. 162-166)

Mr. Mulliner's letter was admitted

into evidence and considered.
Also in the letter of Plaintiff's counsel of October 29,
1974, Plaintiff rested his case:
"With the inclusion of this report, the employee,
Willie M. Salas, will rest his case with all the
evidence that is in the record at the present time."
(R. 16 3)
-12Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

No recitation of law is necessary in light of these
facts.

There is no evidence that Plaintiff was denied a Full

and Fair Hearing.

There is no indication that Mr. Mulliner was

within the jurisdiction of the Commission at the time of the
original hearing and thereafter.

No indication was ever given

to the Administrative Law Judge that he was about to leave the
jurisdiction so that a continued hearing could be scheduled more
rapidly.

Two and one half months is not unusual nor an inordinant

length of time to wait a scheduling of the continued hearing.
That hearing certainly had to take its place in the regular turn
of scheduling barring unusual circumstances which were never
presented to the Administrative Law Judge.

While he was in the

jurisdiction, Mr. Mulliner1s deposition could have been taken
to preserve his testimony, but no effort was made in that direction.
Again, it is not the responsibility of either Defendants or

the

Commission to procure and produce witnesses and evidence for
Plaintiff. Most importantly, Plaintiff rested his case on
October 29, 1974. (R. 163)
One final point, if Mr. Mullinerfs

oral testimony

comported with his official report and his letter, there would
still be no evidence to support the claim of "willfulness".
(See Argument Point I)
Plaintiff was indeed given a Full and Fair Hearing.
He had every opportunity to present his entire claim.
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CONCLUSION
The claimant has failed to present evidence which
could support his claim that Defendant, Eaton Metals, willfully
failed to comply with the law or any lawful order of the
Industrial Commission.

The Plaintiff was not denied due process

of law and did receive a full and fair hearing.

Therefore, the

order of the Industrial Commission of Utah denying a 15% increase
in the benefits to Plaintiff should be affirmed.
DATED this 19th day of November, 1976.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,

IES R. BLACK
for Defendant
ispondent
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